I acknowledge your perspective; however, it appears to reflect false narratives originating from Moscow over the past five to six decades, mostly tailored for Western intellectual audiences.
The notion that Russia's expansion stems from geopolitical or demographic insecurities is a constructed narrative. Since 1945, the upper echelons of Russian elites have perceived external threats as significant, let alone. While there was some apprehension in 1991, it did not equate to a sense of insecurity.
Regarding the general populace, suggesting that ordinary Russians feel insecure is a misinterpretation. Historically, they have been deprived of agency and subjecthood. The Russian elite seldom sought the opinions of regular citizens, notably only in March 1917 and 1990. Many Russians inherently understand that their primary adversaries are domestic entities: the police, the ruling class, and the FSB.
Russia is Moscow's centralized totalitarian empire and a thermonuclear superpower. It does not exhibit an instinct of insecurity or fear of the external world. Moscow knows perfectly that the West is no threat for Russia. Moscow's invasions of other nations are driven by expansionist objectives rather, nothing related to defensive anxieties.
It's expansionism. Russia expands because an empire expands to the extent when it hits another empire. That's all it is. A 19th-century citation, despite its negative connotation of the author, encapsulates this sentiment:
> "I ask you, what has changed? Has the danger from the Russia side been lessoned? No. Rather, the delusion of the ruling classes of Europe has reached its pinnacle. Above all, nothing has changed in Russia's policy, as her official historian Karamsin admits. Her methods, her tactics, her maneuvers may change, but the pole star -- world domination -- is immutable. Only a crafty government, ruling over a mass of barbarians, could devise such a plan nowadays. Pozzo di Borgo, the greatest Russian diplomat of modern times, wrote to Alexander I during the Congress of Vienna that Poland was the most important instrument in carrying out Russian intentions for world domination; but it is also an insurmountable obstacle, if the Pole, tired of its unceasing betrayal by Europe, does not become a fearful whip in the hands of the Muscovites. Now, without speaking of the mood of the Polish people, I ask: Has anything taken place that would frustrate Russia's plans or paralyze her actions?"
Peter Zeihan concurs with you and repeats the same misconception. A common tendency among Western intellectuals is to overlook the fact that since 1941, the only global power that has posed a real threat to Russia is China. This was evident in 1969 when the Chinese military attacked Russia, and it continues today with the Chinese government issuing statements and papers asserting territorial claims over Russia’s Far East.
Your understanding of Russia’s intentions and motives is as flawed as your perception of Alexander Dugin’s role in Russian politics. Dugin is not "Putin’s brain"—in reality, Putin has little regard for Dugin’s thinkings and would likely be indifferent if Dugin were eliminated. Dugin is not a philosopher or an leader of Russian ideas, but rather a propaganda figure, much like Dmitri Trenin (Дмитрий Тренин), Dmitri Simes (Дмитрий Константинович Симес), Vladimir Posner (Познер), and Metropolitan Hilarion (Григо́рий Вале́риевич Алфе́ев). Moreover, compared to Dugin, Trenin, Simes, and Hilarion have far greater intellectual standing and significance. It’s worth noting that Dugin’s spoken Russian is worse than Steve Bannon’s spoken English. His only real distinction in Russia is being the son of a KGB general.
Yes: the "Long Telegram" contains perhaps George Kennan’s greatest misjudgment, to the extent that one might question his competence and even scrutinise his time in the USSR more critically.
Vlad Vexler comes closer to reality when he says, "Regime security is the reason for Russia’s wars," but even this framing is misleading. The simplest way to describe Russia’s motivation is: "I invade because I can."
I acknowledge your perspective; however, it appears to reflect false narratives originating from Moscow over the past five to six decades, mostly tailored for Western intellectual audiences.
The notion that Russia's expansion stems from geopolitical or demographic insecurities is a constructed narrative. Since 1945, the upper echelons of Russian elites have perceived external threats as significant, let alone. While there was some apprehension in 1991, it did not equate to a sense of insecurity.
Regarding the general populace, suggesting that ordinary Russians feel insecure is a misinterpretation. Historically, they have been deprived of agency and subjecthood. The Russian elite seldom sought the opinions of regular citizens, notably only in March 1917 and 1990. Many Russians inherently understand that their primary adversaries are domestic entities: the police, the ruling class, and the FSB.
Russia is Moscow's centralized totalitarian empire and a thermonuclear superpower. It does not exhibit an instinct of insecurity or fear of the external world. Moscow knows perfectly that the West is no threat for Russia. Moscow's invasions of other nations are driven by expansionist objectives rather, nothing related to defensive anxieties.
It's expansionism. Russia expands because an empire expands to the extent when it hits another empire. That's all it is. A 19th-century citation, despite its negative connotation of the author, encapsulates this sentiment:
> "I ask you, what has changed? Has the danger from the Russia side been lessoned? No. Rather, the delusion of the ruling classes of Europe has reached its pinnacle. Above all, nothing has changed in Russia's policy, as her official historian Karamsin admits. Her methods, her tactics, her maneuvers may change, but the pole star -- world domination -- is immutable. Only a crafty government, ruling over a mass of barbarians, could devise such a plan nowadays. Pozzo di Borgo, the greatest Russian diplomat of modern times, wrote to Alexander I during the Congress of Vienna that Poland was the most important instrument in carrying out Russian intentions for world domination; but it is also an insurmountable obstacle, if the Pole, tired of its unceasing betrayal by Europe, does not become a fearful whip in the hands of the Muscovites. Now, without speaking of the mood of the Polish people, I ask: Has anything taken place that would frustrate Russia's plans or paralyze her actions?"
www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867/01/22.htm
Peter Zeihan concurs with you and repeats the same misconception. A common tendency among Western intellectuals is to overlook the fact that since 1941, the only global power that has posed a real threat to Russia is China. This was evident in 1969 when the Chinese military attacked Russia, and it continues today with the Chinese government issuing statements and papers asserting territorial claims over Russia’s Far East.
Your understanding of Russia’s intentions and motives is as flawed as your perception of Alexander Dugin’s role in Russian politics. Dugin is not "Putin’s brain"—in reality, Putin has little regard for Dugin’s thinkings and would likely be indifferent if Dugin were eliminated. Dugin is not a philosopher or an leader of Russian ideas, but rather a propaganda figure, much like Dmitri Trenin (Дмитрий Тренин), Dmitri Simes (Дмитрий Константинович Симес), Vladimir Posner (Познер), and Metropolitan Hilarion (Григо́рий Вале́риевич Алфе́ев). Moreover, compared to Dugin, Trenin, Simes, and Hilarion have far greater intellectual standing and significance. It’s worth noting that Dugin’s spoken Russian is worse than Steve Bannon’s spoken English. His only real distinction in Russia is being the son of a KGB general.
Yes: the "Long Telegram" contains perhaps George Kennan’s greatest misjudgment, to the extent that one might question his competence and even scrutinise his time in the USSR more critically.
Vlad Vexler comes closer to reality when he says, "Regime security is the reason for Russia’s wars," but even this framing is misleading. The simplest way to describe Russia’s motivation is: "I invade because I can."
Yes, if only we still had “security and expert analysts